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If a coalition of countries implements climate policies, nonparticipants tend to consume more, 
pollute more, and invest too little in renewable energy sources. In response, the coalition’s 
equilibrium policy distorts trade and it is not time consistent. By adding a market for the right 
to exploit fossil fuel deposits, I show that these problems vanish and the first best is 
implemented. When the market for deposits clears, the coalition relies entirely on supply-side 
policies, which is simple to implement in practice. The result illustrates that efficiency can be 
obtained without Coasian negotiations ex post, if key inputs are tradable ex ante. 
JEL-Code: Q54, Q58, H23, F55. 
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I have benefitted from the comments of Rolf Golombek, Michael Hoel, Garrett Johnson, 
Benny Moldovanu, Rob Porter, and Jean Tirole. 1. Introduction
"Coal Mine in Montana for sale" (www.tradekey.com)
Not even the Copenhagen Accord was able to secure full participation. The Accord,
negotiated last December, recognizes the need to reduce global CO2 emissions but it
does not bind the participants in any way. The intense negotiations revealed that many
countries are unlikely to ever sign a legally binding climate treaty. Currently, only 37
countries are committed to binding targets under the Kyoto Protocol.
While nonparticipants are likely to pollute too much, the main concern is that their
existence may undermine the climate coalition￿ s e⁄ort. When the coalition introduces
regulation, the world prices change, market shares shift, industries relocate, and nonpar-
ticipants may end up emitting more than they did before. The International Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC, 2007: 665) de￿nes carbon leakage as "the increase in CO2 emis-
sions outside the countries taking domestic mitigation action divided by the reduction in
the emissions of these countries." Most estimates of leakage are between 5% and 20%,
but the number can be higher if the coalition is small, the policy ambitious, and the time
horizon long.1 Carbon leakage discourages countries from reducing pollution and it may
motivate tari⁄s on trade.2 Thus, Frankel (2009: 507) concludes, "it is essential to ￿nd
ways to address concerns about competitiveness and leakage."
This paper considers a coalition of countries harmed by the consumption of fossil
fuel. Countries outside of the coalition are naturally polluting too much compared to
the optimum. In addition, if the coalition reduces its demand for fossil fuel, the world
price for fuel declines and the nonparticipating countries consume more. If the coalition
1See the surveys in IPCC (2007), Frankel (2009), and Rauscher (1997). The variation in estimates
hinges on a number of factors. For the countries signing the Kyoto Protocol, B￿hringer and L￿schel
(2002: 152) estimate leakage to increase from 22% to 28% when the US dropped out. For forest carbon
sequestration in the US, Murray et al. (2004) calculate leakage rates between 10% and 90%, depending
on the particular region. Demailly and Quirion (2008) estimate a leakage rate of 20% for the cement
industry, but the number decreases with border measures. Babiker (2005) takes a long-run perspective
by allowing ￿rms to enter and exit, and ￿nds that leakage can be up to 130%.
2While estimates of leakage vary, Financial Times writes "the fear of it is enough to persuade many
companies to lobby their governments against carbon regulation, or in favour of punitive measures such as
border taxes on imports." But: "the danger is that arguments over border taxes could make an agreement
even more di¢ cult to negotiate," and it is an "easy way to start a trade war." The quotes are dated Dec.
11, 2009; Nov 5, 2009; and Dec. 9, 2009, respectively.
2shrinks its supply of fossil fuel, the nonparticipants increase their supply. If countries can
invest in renewable energy sources, nonparticipants invest too little. For the coalition,
regulating consumption, production, and trade is a second-best solution. However, the
policy may not be time consistent and, in equilibrium, the coalition sets policies such as
to in￿ uence its terms-of-trade as well as the environment.
By allowing for trade in fossil fuel deposits, all these problems vanish and the ￿rst-
best outcome is implemented. In equilibrium, the coalition purchases the right to exploit
the fossil fuel deposits that are most polluting or costly to exploit. This makes the
non-participants￿supply locally inelastic, the supply-side leakage is eliminated and the
coalition chooses to rely entirely on reducing its supply and not its demand. This, in turn,
eliminates consumption leakage, the consumption price is equalized across countries and
all investments are then e¢ cient.
The ￿rst-best policy is simple to implement once the market for deposits has cleared:
the coalition only needs to set aside certain deposits, for example by specifying an ex-
traction fee high enough to make them unpro￿table. There is neither a desire nor a
need to in addition regulate consumption or trade. Note that, rather than purchasing
foreign deposits, a leasing arrangement may su¢ ce. In reality, countries are frequently
selling, auctioning, licensing, or outsourcing the right to extract oil and other minerals to
international companies as well as to major countries such as India and China.3
The paper combines two strands of literature. On the one hand, there is a growing
literature on carbon leakage, resting on the prediction that some countries will not partic-
ipate in a climate coalition.4 Markusen (1975) showed that one country￿ s environmental
policy a⁄ects world prices and thus consumption and pollution abroad. In addition, capi-
tal may relocate (Rauscher, 1997) and ￿rms might move (Markusen et al., 1993 and 1995).
The typical second-best remedy5 is to set tari⁄s or border taxes (Markusen, 1975; Hoel,
3For a history of the oil industry and governmental involvements, see Yergin (2009).
4Although there is no consensus on how to model coalition formation, environmental agreements have
often been modeled as a two-stage process: ￿rst, a country decides whether to participate; second, the
participants maximize their joint utility by choosing appropriate policies. This procedure typically leads
to free-riding (Barrett, 2005, surveys the literature).
5Other second-best suggestions include reducing the harshness of the policy (Rauscher, 1997; B￿hringer
and L￿schel, 2002), grandfathering emission quotas (B￿hringer and L￿schel, 2002), and restricting trade
in pollution permits (Copeland and Taylor, 2005).
31996; and Rauscher, 1997).6 However, countries have incentives to let the tari⁄ in￿ uence
their terms-of-trade.7 In fact, Liski and Tahvonen (2004) show that a country may bene￿t
from being harmed by pollution if this justi￿es border measures. Most of this literature
focuses on demand-side climate policies. In many ways, Hoel (1994) provides the most
general model by also allowing the coalition to limit its supply. Since the game by Hoel
is a proper subgame of the game I present, this paper generalizes several of the above
results before obtaining its main result.
On the other hand, the literature following Coase (1960) argues that the parties can
attain e¢ ciency by negotiating activities ex post, no matter the allocation of property
rights. The coalition should then be able to negotiate with and bribe nonparticipating
countries to reduce their consumption of fuel. The literature on leakage must thus assume
that transaction (or contracting) costs prevent such e⁄ective ex post negotiations. Coase
(1960: 15) admits that such transaction costs often exist. But, rather than predicting
leakages, Coase (1937 and 1960) suggested that such transactions should and will take
place inside ￿the ￿rm.￿This has inspired Williamson￿ s (1975) theory of the ￿rm as well
as literatures on vertical integration and horizontal mergers.8
The two strands of literature have remained distinct since it would not be realistic
to politically integrate "only" to mitigate climate change. However, note that Perry and
Porter (1985) model mergers basically as trade in input factors. Similarly, Es￿ et al. (2010)
investigate when a market for capacity leads an industry to maximize its total surplus.
In the electricity sector, trading the transmission rights before generating power may
help the providers maximize joint pro￿t (Joskow and Tirole, 2000). These papers suggest
that trading inputs may substitute for ex post negotiation, but they study concentration
of market powers and not the internalization of externalities, more generally.9 To my
6Certain environmentally motivated border measures are indeed permitted by the WTO, and the Mon-
treal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, signed in 1987, does contain the possibility
to restrict trade from noncompliant countries.
7Rauscher (1997: 3) admits that "Green arguments can easily be abused to justify trade restrictions
that are in reality only protectionist measures and it is often di¢ cult to discriminate between true and
pretended environmentalism."
8See Gaudet and Salant (1991) or Kamien and Zang (1990) on horizontal mergers, and the survey by
Katz (1989) or Rey and Tirole (2007) on vertical integration.
9A literature on international trade, initiated by Mundell (1957) and surveyed by Jones (2000), in-
vestigates whether trade in input factors is a perfect substitute to trade in ￿nal goods. In this paper,
trading factors is strictly better since there are externalities and the factor owner can unilaterally decide
4knowledge, Bohm (1993) is the only other paper studying how analogous trade in fossil fuel
deposits may help a coalition curb climate change. Assuming linear demand and supply
curves, Bohm investigated when a reduction in consumption should be accompanied by an
identical reduction in supply. This may necessitate purchasing or leasing foreign deposits,
and Bohm documented that this could be realistic in practice.10
Building on these contributions, this paper shows that e¢ ciency is often obtained,
even if Coasian bargaining on ex post actions is impossible, if just key inputs, such as
fossil fuel deposits, are tradable ex ante. This provides an argument against a climate
policy primarily focused on reducing demand, and a strong case for instead reducing the
supply - including the supply of nonparticipating countries.
This insight can certainly be applied to other situations. For example, boycotting
timber is an ine⁄ective way of preserving tropical forests since the timber price declines
and other buyers increase their consumption. A more e⁄ective solution, according to this
paper, is to pay developing countries to reduce their deforestation. The recent emergence
of REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) funds is con-
sistent with this conclusion. Such funds have now been set up by the United Nations, the
World Bank, and Norway.
While the next section presents the basic model, the main result (Theorem 1) is
discussed in Section 3. Section 4 generalizes the model and the result by allowing for
investments in technologies, multiple periods, heterogeneous fossil fuels, and it endogenizes
participation. Section 5 concludes and the Appendix contains all the proofs.
2. The basic model
There are two sets of countries: one set, M, participates in the climate treaty while the
other set, N, does not. This paper focuses on the interaction between these sets and
thus abstracts from internal con￿ icts or decision-making within M. I will thus treat M
as one player or country, perhaps assuming that the participating countries have agreed
whether the factor is to be used for production.
10In contrast, the literature on tradable pollution permits (surveyed by Tietenberg, 2006), presumes
that all trading countries are participating in the coalition. Trading permits within the coalition is just
a way of obtaining a certain emission reduction e¢ ciently and it does not eliminate leakages.
5to maximize the sum of their utilities. The nonparticipating countries, N, interact with
each other and with M only through markets.
Every country bene￿ts from consuming energy, but fuel is costly to extract. If a
country i 2 M [ N consumes yi units of fuel, i￿ s bene￿t is given by the function Bi (yi),
which is twice di⁄erentiable and satis￿es B0
i > 0 ￿ B00
i . Country i￿ s cost of supplying or
extracting xi units is represented by an increasing and strictly convex function, Ci (xi).
There is a world market for fuel and p measures the equilibrium price. Assuming quasi-
linear utility functions, the payo⁄s are:
Ui = Bi (yi) ￿ Ci (xi) ￿ p(yi ￿ xi) if i 2 N;






if i = M;
where H (:) is the harm experienced by M from the pollution. H0 > 0 and H00 ￿ 0: I
assume that only M, and not i 2 N have environmental concerns. This may be reasonable
since i 2 N is not participating in the climate treaty, and it may explain this very fact.
Alternatively, one could assume that nonparticipants act as if they have no environmental
concern, for example because domestic forces hinder the implementation of a climate
policy unless the government has committed by signing an international treaty.11 The
extension in Section 4.4 allows i 2 N to be harmed by pollution. Section 4.3 permits
various fuels (such as gas and coal) to di⁄er in their environmental impact.
I assume that i 2 N chooses xi and yi taking the fuel price as given. This is natural
if the decisions to consume and produce are decentralized to agents with little market
power. Thus, the assumption does not imply that i; as a country, is tiny. Alternatively,
the price-taking assumption would hold if p followed from M￿ s climate policy set earlier
in the game.
To cope with the environmental harm, M sets environmental policies. This amounts
to setting xM and yM if relying on quotas for extraction and consumption. The price for







11Similarly, liberalizing trade policies may be di¢ cult for political reasons, and being committed by a
trade treaty can be help (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001).
6Since the market-clearing condition must hold, and
P
N (yi ￿ xi) = xM ￿ yM depends
on p, the outcome would be identical if M instead could choose xM and p and let yM
clear the market. Similarly, M may regulate xM and yM by setting a tax ￿x on domestic
production, a tax ￿y on consumption, and perhaps even a tari⁄ ￿I on import (or such
an export subsidy). Any tax vector ￿ = f￿x;￿y;￿Ig is going to pin down xM, yM and p.
The outcome is going to be identical no matter how M in￿ uences these variables, and the
choice between quotas and taxes is therefore immaterial in this model.12 In any case, the
equilibrium fuel price is in￿ uenced by M￿ s policies and M does, of course, take this e⁄ect
into account.
The novel part of the model is that I endogenize Ci (:) by allowing for trade in de-
posits.13 There is a continuum of deposits, and the cost function Ci (:) is implicitly order-
ing a country￿ s deposits according to their extraction costs. This is natural, since a country
that is extracting xi units would always prefer to ￿rst extract the deposits that have the
lowest possible extraction costs. A small deposit allocated between x0
i and x00
i is charac-
terized by its size ￿ ￿ x00
i ￿x0
i and its marginal extraction cost c ￿ [Ci (x00
i) ￿ Ci (x0
i)]=￿:
In the deposit market, M may purchase from i 2 N the right to exploit such a deposit.
The market is cleared if, and only if, there exists no pair of countries (i;j) 2 (M [ N)
2
and no price such that both i and j strictly bene￿t from transferring the right to exploit
a deposit from i to j at that price. If this condition is not satis￿ed, there are still gains
from trade. With this equilibrium concept, I can check whether a particular allocation of
deposits, leading to a particular Ci (:) and CM (:), constitutes an equilibrium.
Note that I do not need to specify a market structure leading to this equilibrium.
But, as discussed in Section 4.5, there are several possibilities. For example, one could
let i 2 (M [ N) make a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er to the other countries, conditional on the
o⁄er being accepted by everyone.
The timing of the game is given by Figure 1: after the deposit market clears, M sets
12This is in line with Weitzman (1974), showing that uncertainty regarding the parameters is necessary
to rank quotas and taxes.
13Of course, the aggregate world-wide cost function is exogenously given. For any allocation of deposits,
we could write it as:








7its policies and, ￿nally, the fossil fuel market clears.14 The next section solves the game
by backwards induction in order to characterize all subgame-perfect equilibria. Several
extensions are discussed in Section 4.
Figure 1: Timing of the game
3. The equilibrium
As a benchmark, note that the ￿rst best is given by equalizing every country￿ s marginal
bene￿t of consumption to the marginal cost of production plus the marginal environmental


























i) 8i;j 2 M [ N; (3.1)
where I let C0
i (xi) ￿ [lim￿"0 C0
i (xi + ￿);lim￿#0 C0
i (xi + ￿)] be an interval if C0
i (xi) is dis-
continuous at xi (i.e., if Ci (xi) has a kink at xi). Thus, C0
i (:) may be a correspondence,
and not a function.
3.1. The market for fuel
At the third stage, each nonparticipating country, i 2 N, simply sets its marginal bene￿t
B
0
i(yi) = p ) yi = Di (p) ￿ B
0￿1
i (p): (3.2)
The demand by i 2 N is thus given by Di (p). On the production side, C0
i (xi) = p, if
C0
i (xi) is singular. If C0
i (xi) is nonsingular, p 2 C0
i (xi). Since Ci (:) is a strictly convex
function, the correspondence C0
i (:) is invertible and its inverse, xi = Si (p) ￿ C
0￿1
i (p); is
a function. Obviously, if C0
i (xi) is nonsingular at xi, S0




i (xi) ) xi = Si (p) ￿ C
0￿1
i (p)8i 2 N: (3.3)
14I do not allow nonparticipating governments to set policies in￿ uencing supply and demand. Allowing
for this would complicate the analysis without altering the main result, as argued in Section 4.5.
8For the coalition M, supply and demand depends on the policies, determined at the
second stage. For example, yM could be set directly by a consumption quota, while xM
could be set directly by an extraction quota. Alternatively, the government may specify
a tax vector ￿ and redistribute the revenues lump sum within M. If the consumers and
suppliers in M are price-takers when trading fuel, xM and yM would be given by:
￿
B0
M(yM) = p + ￿y + ￿I
C0




yM = DM (p + ￿y + ￿I) ￿ B
0￿1
M (p + ￿y + ￿I)
xM = SM (p ￿ ￿x + ￿I) ￿ C
0￿1




Clearly, xM and yM can be implemented by any two of f￿x;￿y;￿Ig. In any case, p is such
that the market clears:










At the second stage, M maximizes







￿ p(yM ￿ xM);
subject to (3.2)-(3.5). By choosing ￿, the system (3.2)-(3.5) of 2n+3 equations uniquely
determines every xi, yi, and p for the third stage. Equivalently, M can directly specify xM
and yM, and let p, xi and yi, i 2 N, be determined by (3.2)-(3.3) and (3.5). Substituted
in (3.4), one can easily derive a set of taxes that can implement this policy. In any case,
we can state:
Lemma 1. M￿ s equilibrium policy implements:
B
0
M (yM) = p +
￿
S0 (p)


















S0 (p) ￿ D0 (p)
: (3.7)
Compared to the ￿rst best (3.1), the equilibrium is generally quite di⁄erent. Neither
marginal bene￿ts nor marginal costs are equalized across countries. M understands that
9by reducing its supply, p increases, and N extracts more. By reducing M￿ s consumption,
p declines, and N consumes more. The conditions (3.6)-(3.7) show how M balances these
two types of leakages: Abstracting from the last terms (i.e., if yM = xM), M would focus
on demand-side policies, and reduce yM, if foreign supply were elastic relative to demand.
If demand were more elastic than supply, M would focus on reducing its supply xM rather
than its demand.
In addition, the last terms in (3.6)-(3.7) show that M sets policies considering the
impact on its terms of trade. If M is exporting fossil fuel, M prefers to reduce its
production and increase its consumption, since both changes increase the price M receives
for its export. M￿ s ability to a⁄ect the equilibrium price is another reason why the ￿rst
best is generally not achieved, besides the free riding and the two types of leakages.
Lemma 1 is, basically, identical to Hoel￿ s (1994) equations (9)-(10). Although Hoel
does not allow for a tari⁄ (￿I = 0), he shows that M￿ s ideal policy can be implemented




















S0 (p) ￿ D0 (p)
:
Note that the sum of the taxes is always equal to H0, the marginal harm.
Alternatively, (3.6)-(3.7) can be implemented by a production tax and a tari⁄ (while













The production tax should be Pigouvian and the emission from M￿ s supply is thus inde-
pendent of the terms-of-trade e⁄ects. This is in line with Copeland and Taylor (1995),
Proposition 8. The leakages are dealt with by the tari⁄. Since the tari⁄reduces domestic
consumption, it should be high if the demand-side leakage is low while the supply-side
leakage large. To a⁄ect its terms-of-trade, M sets a high tari⁄if it is importing but a low
tari⁄ (or export subsidy) if it is exporting.
103.3. The market for deposits
Consider the ￿rst stage of the game. The right to extract each deposit can be traded in a
market. The market clears when there exists no pair of countries that would both strictly
bene￿t from trading some of their deposits at some price. This market endogenizes the
allocation of deposits, the cost functions Ci (:) and thus the supply curves Si (:).
The market equilibrium cannot be unique since if each of two countries exploit one
deposit, they could easily exchange these two deposits and that would constitute another
equilibrium. Nevertheless, I can state the following result:
Theorem 1 (i). In every equilibrium of the deposit market, M￿ s equilibrium policy (3.6)-
(3.7) implements the ￿rst best (3.1).
The result might surprise since (3.6) appears to be substantially di⁄erent from the ￿rst
best (3.1). The equilibrium from stage two is generally ine¢ cient because of free-riding,
consumption leakage, production leakage, and M￿ s market power. All these problems
vanish once the deposit market has cleared.
The theorem follows from Lemmas 2, 3 and 4:
Lemma 2. In every equilibrium, xi = yi 8i 2 M [ N.
When the market for deposits clears, every country expects to rely on neither import
nor export of fossil fuel. That this is a feasible equilibrium may not be surprising since M
can equally well sell a deposit to i instead of selling the fuel exploited afterwards. Lemma
2 goes further, however, and claims that xi = yi always. The intuition is the following.
Suppose M is a net exporter and i 2 N is an importer. If M sells a small deposit to i,
which is such that any owner would exploit it, then M is afterwards exporting a little bit
less. By Lemma 1, M ￿nds it optimal to rely less on supply and more on demand side
policies, and the equilibrium price is slightly reduced. M is indi⁄erent to this change in
the price, since M is always setting the policies such that the price is optimal from M￿ s
point of view. For country i, however, the reduced price is bene￿cial. Thus, i is willing
to pay more for the deposit than M requires for giving it up. In equilibrium, therefore, i
cannot be importing. For similar reasons, i cannot be exporting, either.
11This reasoning assumes that i takes into account that its sale or purchase of deposits
may a⁄ect the equilibrium price of fuel. This can be consistent with the assumption that i
takes the fuel price as given at stage 3: The consumers and suppliers in country i may take
the fuel price at stage 3 as given, even if their government realizes that trading national
deposits may a⁄ect the world price. Alternatively, if the price follows from M￿ s policy at
stage 2, it is ￿xed at stage 3 although i￿ s sale at stage 1 can in￿ uence M￿ s policy at stage
2 and thus the price at stage 3.15
The next stepping stone for Theorem 1 is:
Lemma 3. In every equilibrium, S0
i (p) = 0 8i 2 N.
In other words, C0
i (:) is vertical and jumps at the equilibrium xi, i 2 N. The reason
is, as the proof shows, that M is willing to purchase the deposits that i 2 N is almost
indi⁄erent to exploit. If the marginal cost c of exploiting a deposit is almost as high as the
price p, i is willing to sell the deposit for a low price (p ￿ c). If M purchases this deposit
without exploiting it, M￿ s bene￿t is reduced pollution. This gain is roughly H0 > 0,
certainly larger than the price for the deposit when c ￿ p. Intuitively, if M considers
purchasing, without exploiting, any of i￿ s deposits, it is certainly cheapest to buy deposits
that are expensive to exploit. Hence, when the market for deposits clears, the supply of
i 2 N is locally inelastic.
By combining Lemmas 1-3, B0
M (yM) = p = B0
i (yi)8i 2 N. Since the supply of country
i 2 N is locally inelastic, M does not fear supply-side leakage, and it can rely entirely on
supply-side politics. Since there is no need to regulate demand, there is no consumption
leakage and the marginal bene￿ts of fossil fuel are equalized across countries.
The ￿nal stepping stone for Theorem 1 is:
Lemma 4. In every equilibrium, p ￿ H0 (:) 2 C0
i (xi) and p 2 C0
i (xi) 8i 2 N.
In words, i 2 N does not own any deposit with marginal extraction cost between
p￿H0 (:) and p. All such deposits are purchased by M. The reason is that while i would
15Instead of maximizing UM by choosing xM and yM at stage 2, suppose M instead choose p and, say,
xM. Also in this case, (3.2)-(3.5) must hold and the ￿rst-order conditions for the policy are going to be
the same.
12bene￿t from exploiting such deposits, M bene￿ts more by preserving them. Note that
Lemma 4 implies S0
i (￿) = 0 for all ￿ 2 [p ￿ H0 (:);p]; and Lemma 3 follows as a corollary.
Since Lemmas 1-3 also imply that p￿H0 (:) 2 C0
M (xM), all countries extract the optimal
amounts of fossil fuel.
3.4. Implementation
This policy is simple to implement in practice. Instead of calculating taxes for con-
sumption and production, M simply purchases the deposits that are most expensive to
exploit. Thereafter, M implements the ￿rst best by setting aside these deposits, or by
using an extraction tax (￿x = H0) high enough to make them unpro￿table. Finally, the
market forces equalize marginal bene￿ts and neither demand nor trade need regulation
(i.e., ￿y = ￿I = 0).
Creating a market for deposits might be the most controversial aspect of this policy.
However, note that a rental market su¢ ces: M does not need to purchase the permanent
right to exploit deposits. Instead, M can simply pay i 2 N for not extracting speci￿ed
deposits.
3.5. An example
The outcome is particularly simple if N = f1g, H (:) = h
P
M[N xi, and if the supply and
demand curves were initially identical and linear in both countries. Without a deposit
market, N would consume and supply x0 in Figure 2, while M would consume and extract
x￿. The area of the triangle a = (x0 ￿ x￿)h=2 measures the social loss as well as N￿ s
private cost of reducing its supply from x0 to x￿. With a deposit market, M purchases all
deposits with marginal extraction costs between p￿ ￿ h and p￿. For this, M must pay a
if M makes a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er but 2a if N makes a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er. In any
case, the supply curve of N shifts from C0
i to C0
N, while the supply curve of M shifts from
C0
i to C0
M. With the extraction tax h in M, both M and N extract x￿ and the equilibrium
consumption price is p￿.
13Figure 2: M purchases deposits with marginal costs between p￿ ￿ h and p￿ and
implements the ￿rst best.
4. Generalizing the result
4.1. Endogenous technology
Developing new technology is central in the debate on how to cope with climate change.
An important extension of the above model is thus to endogenize the technologies, and let
countries invest in them. This extension, it turns out, strengthens the case for a market
in deposits.
Suppose that every i 2 M [ N can invest ri in technology at cost ki (ri), where
k0
i (:);k00
i (:) > 0. To simplify, there are no spillovers or trade in technologies. The new
technology is a substitute to polluting and it can represent, for example, renewable energy
sources.16 Country i consumes energy from both sources and we may write its total
bene￿t as e Bi (yi + ri). Pre-investment policy refers to the case where investments take
place between stage 2 and stage 3. Post-investment policy refers to the situation where
the investment stage is between stage 1 and stage 2. Solving the game by backwards
induction, I ￿rst solve the game for a generic distribution of deposits.
16Allowing for investments in extraction technologies would be interesting but is omitted to save space.
14Assume, to begin, that i 2 M [N is a price-taker when investing, for example because
investments are made by private entities in country i. Then, e B0
i (:) is the willingness to




i (yi + ri) = k
0
i (ri) 8i 2 M [ N:
Is M￿ s investment level rM optimal? It is, from M￿ s point of view. While a larger
rM decreases the need for fuel and thus the equilibrium fuel price, p is optimally chosen
(or in￿ uenced) by M at the policy stage. By the envelope theorem, M￿ s marginal value
of rM is simply e B0
M (:). But the lower p, following a larger rM, is bene￿cial to the
nonparticipants if they are, on average, importing. If xM < yM, the nonparticipants are,
as a group, exporting. The larger rM would then harm them.
Proposition 1. The investment level rM is smaller (larger) than the socially optimal
level if and only if xM > yM (xM < yM).
Are the investments of i 2 N optimal? A larger ri reduces the need to buy fossil fuel,
and the price declines. This is good for an importer but, from a social point of view,
the sum of these terms-of-trade e⁄ects cancel.17 However, the lower price reduces supply
when supply is somewhat elastic (i.e., when S0 > 0) and, then, emission declines as well.
Since this bene￿t is not internalized by i 2 N, it invests too little compared to the social
optimum when S0 > 0, no matter the timing of the investments.
Proposition 2. (i) For every i 2 N; the investment level ri is lower than the socially
optimal level, and it is strictly lower if and only if S0 (p) > 0: (ii) The bene￿t for M of













yM ￿ xM P
N (S0
i (p) ￿ 1=B00
i (p))
8i 2 N: (4.1)
The ￿rst term at the right-hand side of (4.1) is positive and captures the environmental
gain when new technology reduces emissions. The second term is positive unless M is a
17In contrast to M, i 2 N does not set p and it does indeed care about how ri a⁄ects p. Thus, if
i;j 2 N, i 6= j, we can write @Ui=@ri = e B0
i (:) ￿ (yi ￿ xi)@p=@ri, @Uj=@ri = ￿(yj ￿ xj)@p=@ri and
@UM=@ri = ￿(yi ￿ xi)@p=@ri ￿ H0 (:)@ (
P
N xi)=@ri. Summing over these, the terms-of-trade e⁄ects
cancel since
P
M[N (yi ￿ xi) = 0:
15net exporter of fuel. If M were exporting so much that the right-hand side of (4.1) were
negative, M would be harmed by a larger ri, i 2 N, since that would reduce p and thus
M￿ s revenues. But, otherwise, M would like i 2 N to invest more.
If M￿ s policies are set after the investments are ￿xed, D0
i (:) = 1=B00
i (p) and, combining
(4.1) and (3.6),
@UM=@ri = e Bi (yi + ri) ￿ p;
which is equal to M￿ s ideal consumption tax, or tari⁄. When this tax is positive, M
strictly bene￿ts from a marginally larger ri, i 2 N. If it could, M would then like to share
its technology with i, or to invest directly in the nonparticipating countries.
If policies are set before investments, M can indeed in￿ uence i￿ s investment. To
encourage investments, M sets policies that generate a high fuel price. This can be done
by restricting M￿ s supply rather than its demand, for example by having a high supply
tax but a low consumption tax (or tari⁄). Thus, pre-investment policies may rely more
on supply-side politics, and less on demand-side politics, than would post-investment
policies.
Proposition 3. The equilibrium policy is given by Lemma 1 whether the policy is chosen




i (:) = 1= e B
00
i (yi + ri) ￿ 1=k
00
i (ri) < 0 for pre-investment policies,
D
0
i (:) = 1= e B
00
i (yi + ri) < 0 for post-investment policies.
If M sets policies before the investment stage, demand is more elastic. A larger p is
then both reducing yi + ri and increasing ri, thus leading to a further decline in yi. If
the right-hand side of (3.6) is positive, it decreases in jD0
i (:)j, ceteris paribus. When the
right-hand side of (3.6) decreases, xM must decline while yM must increase. Since the
right-hand side can be interpreted as a consumption tax or a tari⁄, this tax should thus
decrease while the extraction tax should increase.
Proposition 2 implies that M￿ s optimal policy is sensitive to the particular timing.
While M would prefer to announce tough supply-side policies before the investment stage,
16in order to encourage investments, after the investment stage it prefers to rely more on
demand-side politics. If a production tax and a tari⁄ is used, M prefers to announce a
low tari⁄before countries invest, but raise it afterwards. The ideal policy of M may thus
not be time consistent.
In summary, for a generic distribution of deposits, investments in renewable energy are
suboptimal for all countries. Nonparticipants invest too little, amplifying their existing
over-pollution. To encourage more investments, M would like to commit to tough supply-
side policies rather than demand-side policies, but this policy may not be time consistent.
All these problems are solved if there is a market for deposits at stage 1.
Theorem 1 (ii). In every equilibrium of the deposit market, M￿ s equilibrium policy
implements the ￿rst best whether it is chosen before or after investments.
The result follows, almost as a corollary, from Propositions 1-3 and Lemmas 1-3.
If the equilibrium in the deposit market is as described in Section 3.3, yi = xi and
M￿ s investments are optimal, according to Proposition 1. Lemma 3 states that S0
i (:) =
08i 2 N, and Proposition 2 then implies that all countries invest optimally. Since the




i = 0, M￿ s
policy is the same whether it is set before or after investments, despite Proposition 3.
Finally, when combining Lemmas 2 and 3 with Proposition 2, @UM=@ri = 0. This implies
that M has no interest in in￿ uencing ri, i 2 N, and the deposit allocation described
by Lemmas 1-4 continues to be an equilibrium. The proof that this must be true in all
equilibria follows the same steps as before.
As a variant of the model, suppose the ri￿ s were not chosen by private investors but by
governments. For i = M, this turned out to be irrelevant since, as noted, rM is optimal
from M￿ s point of view. For i 2 N, this change would not matter if government i took
the price p as given, perhaps because the price has already been set by M at the policy












i) ￿ (yi ￿ xi)@p=@ri 8i 2 N:
Better technology reduces the fuel price (@p=@ri < 0). The lower price is good for country
17i 2 N if it imports fuel but bad if it exports. Hence, importers invest more than exporters.
If (yi ￿ xi) is very large, i may actually invest too much, compared to the social optimum,
just as M would have done, according to Proposition 1. With a deposit market, however,
yi = xi and it does not matter whether i, at the investment stage, takes p as given or not.
The ￿rst best continues to be an equilibrium whether investments are private or public.
4.2. Multiple periods
A one-period model may well capture a dynamic world. In particular, suppose the envi-
ronmental damage H (:) is a function of cumulated emissions, no matter at which point in
time they take place. Then, the ￿rst best is still implemented by the equilibrium above:
M only needs to buy and set aside certain deposits at the start of the game, and let the
market work out the allocation of consumption. If time is a dimension in this allocation,
the equilibrium price path optimally allocates the remaining production and consumption
over time.
Without a deposit market, however, di¢ culties arise. In additional to the ine¢ ciencies
already discussed, there will be intertemporal leakages. If M is expected to reduce its
future consumption, the expected future price declines. This makes it more attractive for
the nonparticipants to extract fuel now. This e⁄ect has been referred to as the "green
paradox" by Sinn (2008), since a harsher environmental policy (in the future) can actually
increase emissions (today). Clearly, the green paradox reduces the value of an anticipated
future demand-side policy.18
To illustrate this, suppose there are two periods, t 2 f1;2g, and let ￿ 2 (0;1) be the
common discount factor. The extraction costs are, as before, associated with the deposits.
Thus, if Ci (:) is i￿ s extraction cost function, the cost of extracting xi;1 units in period 1 is
Ci (xi;1), while the cost of thereafter extracting xi;2 in period 2 is Ci (xi;1 + xi;2)￿Ci (xi;1).
To capture the intuition that climate change is a long-run problem, and its real cost is
coming in the future, let the harm H (:) be experienced only in the second period. Since
greenhouse-gases have a long-lasting impact on the climate, suppose H (:) is a function
18A similar e⁄ect is identi￿ed by Kremer and Morcom (2000), showing that an anticipated future
crackdown on the illegal harvesting of ivory may raise current poaching.
18of cumulated emissions. When the prices in periods 1 and 2 are p1 and p2, the payo⁄ for
i 2 M [ N is:
Ui = Bi;1 (yi;1) ￿ Ci (xi;1) + p1 (xi;1 ￿ yi;1) (4.2)











where the index-function ￿i = 0 for i 2 N and ￿M = 1.
If M can commit to future policies, the timing of the game is the following. In the
￿rst period, M sets fxM;1;yM;1;xM;2;yM;2g. Thereafter, the ￿rst-period fossil fuel market
clears. Finally, the second-period market clears.
Taking the prices as given, the demand in country i 2 N is yi;1 = Di;1 (p1) ￿ B
0￿1
i;1 (p1)
and yi;2 = Di;2 (p2) ￿ B
0￿1
i;2 (p2). In the second period, i￿ s cumulated supply is given by
xi;1 + xi;2 = Si (p2) ￿ C
0￿1
i (p2). In the ￿rst period, i must consider whether to extract
a marginal deposit now or later. This leads to xi;1 = Si ((p1 ￿ ￿p2)=(1 ￿ ￿)).19 In each
period, the market must clear, such that It ￿ yM;t ￿ xM;t =
P
N (xi;t ￿ yi;t)8t 2 f1;2g.20
Anticipating all this, the Appendix derives M￿ s optimal policy for both periods, and
taxes implementing this policy. Just as before, the sum of the taxes must equal the
marginal environmental harm.
Proposition 4. If M can commit, its second-period policies is given by:
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S0 ([p1 ￿ ￿p2]=[1 ￿ ￿]) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)D0
1
[S0 (p2) ￿ D0
2][S0 ([p1 ￿ ￿p2]=[1 ￿ ￿]) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)D0






￿S0 ([p1 ￿ ￿p2]=[1 ￿ ￿])
[S0 (p2) ￿ D0
2][S0 ([p1 ￿ ￿p2]=[1 ￿ ￿]) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)D0
1] ￿ ￿S0 ([p1 ￿ ￿p2]=[1 ￿ ￿])D0
1
:
19Too see this, take a small deposit with marginal cost c. It is extracted in period 1 rather than period 2
if this gives a higher present discounted value of the pro￿t: p1￿c ￿ ￿ (p2 ￿ c) ) c ￿ (p1 ￿ ￿p2)=(1 ￿ ￿):
20This would hold even if fossil fuel could be stored, since rather than storing fossil fuel it would be
cheaper to delay exploiting it.
19On the other hand, if M cannot commit to future policies, its second-period policy
is given by Lemma 1, above. By comparison, the two are, in general, quite di⁄erent.
First, when committing to second-period policies, M would like to consider the e⁄ect on
its terms-of-trade not only for the second period, but also for the ￿rst. Once the second
period has arrived, this e⁄ect is sunk and M can ignore it. This implies that M￿ s ideal
tax policy is not time consistent, also if there are no environmental harm.21
Second, even abstracting from the terms-of-trade e⁄ects, M￿ s preferred policy under
commitment is generally di⁄erent from the equilibrium policy when it cannot commit.
By comparing (4.3)-(4.4) to (3.6)-(3.7) for I1 = I2 = 0, M would prefer to commit to
rely more on supply-side policies, and less on demand-side policies, than what it is going
to ￿nd optimal in period 2. By doing this, M minimizes the intertemporal consumption
leakage and the problems of the "green paradox," discussed above.22 Unfortunately, if M
cannot commit, this policy is not time consistent.
Consider now a deposit market at the beginning of period 1. For the same reason as
before, Lemma 2 continues to hold and xM;t = yM;t, 8t 2 f1;2g. M purchases from country
i 2 N the deposits that are most costly to extract. Thus, Lemmas 3 and 4 continue to
hold for the second period (i.e., for p = p2). This does not imply that i￿ s supply is inelastic
in period 1, but it becomes locally inelastic in period 2. By substituting S0
i (p2) = 0 in
(4.3)-(4.4), M relies entirely on supply-side policies in period 2 whether it can commit or
not. M￿ s policy is thus time consistent.
Once the deposit market clears, the Appendix shows that M relies on supply-side
policies also in the ￿rst period, and that intertemporal e¢ ciency is ensured.
Theorem 1 (iii). With a deposit market in the beginning of the game, the ￿rst best is
implemented by M￿ s equilibrium policies whether or not M can commit to future policies.
M￿ s policy is simple to implement once the deposit market clears. It can just set aside
the costliest deposits and thereafter let the market clear, or it can set an extraction taxes,
21This result is known from Newbery (1976) and the subsequent literature (surveyed by Karp and
Newbery, 1993).
22By instead committing to reducing its future supply, the future fossil fuel price increases, and non-
participants ￿nd it optimal to extract less in period 1 (but, as before, more in period 2). Thus, while
the intertemporal e⁄ect of the second-period policy increases consumption leakage, it does not increase
extraction leakage.
20￿x;t, t 2 f1;2g, high enough to make the marginal deposits unpro￿table. As shown in the
Appendix, these taxes should be Pigouvian:
￿x;1=￿ = ￿x;2 = H
0 (:).
Note that the tax should be positive in both periods. If there were an extraction tax
only in the second period, the private suppliers would prefer to extract in period 1 rather
than in period 2, just to avoid paying this tax. This would generate the green paradox,
discussed above, and the outcome would be dynamically ine¢ cient. To avoid this, the
present-discounted value of the tax should be the same across periods.
The reasoning above continues to hold if there are more than two periods. In any
case, a deposit market at the beginning of the game implements the ￿rst best. Things
would be more complicated, however, if M not only cared about the aggregate emissions,
but the time at which they took place. M may then have an incentive to trade deposits
at the beginning of every period. Whether this would ensure e¢ ciency would depend on
the structure of the deposit market. For example, if M could in￿ uence the future price
it would pay for deposits by extracting less today, it would distort its extraction path in
order to in￿ uence its future terms-of-trade. For similar reasons, a rental market for the
right to extract deposits may not guarantee the ￿rst best, if the future rental price can
be in￿ uenced by M￿ s extraction path.
4.3. Heterogeneous fuels
The analysis above assumed that consuming one unit of fossil fuel created one unit of
pollution. In reality, fuel types di⁄er in their carbon content: natural gas pollutes less than
oil which, in turn, pollutes less than coal. Oil ￿elds themselves di⁄er widely: exploiting
Canadian oil sands pollutes more than extracting North-Sea oil, for instance.
The model can accommodate heterogeneous fuels both within and between countries.
For a small deposit of size ￿, let c be its marginal production cost and e its marginal
emission content. Thus, the cost and emissions from exploiting this deposit are c￿￿ and
e￿￿. As before, the deposits belonging to i 2 N are ordered according to their extraction
21costs.23 If country i 2 N supplies xi units, its total emission is Ei (xi), where E0
i (xi) is the
marginal emission content of a deposit located at xi. If E0
i (xi) is increasing (decreasing),
the fuel that is most costly to extract is most (least) polluting. Assume that E0
i (:) is
continuous at xi if C0
i (:) is continuous at xi,24 and that E0
i (xi) ￿ e for all i and xi, for
some e > 0. If i 2 M [N supplies xi units, the total emissions level is
P
M[N Ei (xi), and
the harm, experienced by M, is H (
P
M[N Ei (xi)).
Optimally, marginal bene￿ts should be equalized across countries and a marginal de-
posit should be extracted if and only if:
c + eH
0 (:) ￿ B
0
j (yj) = B
0
i (yi)8i;j 2 M [ N: (4.5)
To ￿nd the equilibrium, note that stage 3 has the same outcome as in Section 3.1. At
stage 2, M sets policies taking into account leakages and their emission content.
Lemma 5. M￿ s equilibrium policy implements:
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S0 (p) ￿ D0 (p)
(4.7)
Note that M focuses more on reducing its demand, and less on reducing its supply, if
fuel abroad tends to be dirtier than domestic fuel, particularly if this is true for foreign
countries with a very elastic supply function. Just as before, one can easily ￿nd taxes
implementing this policy. If E0
M is much smaller than E0
i, M may ￿nd it optimal to subsi-
dize domestic extraction (￿x < 0). This may be the case, for example, if the participants
possess gas while the nonparticipants rely on coal. The lemma generalizes the result by
Golombek et al. (1995), who extend the model by Hoel (1994) to allow for three types of
fuel.
Although Lemma 5 describes M￿ s best policy to cope with free-riding and leakages,
the outcome is not ￿rst best for a generic allocation of deposits. In addition to the
23The deposits belonging to M are ordered according to c + eH0 (:), where H0 (:) is evaluated at the
equilibrium pollution level. The reason is that M is always exploiting the deposits with the smallest
c + eH0 (:).
24This requires that deposits having almost identical extraction costs also have similar emission content.
This assumption saves a step in the proof.
22ine¢ ciencies discussed already, country i 2 N tends to exploit the wrong deposits. Since
i 2 N does not internalize the environmental harm, it might exploit deposits that have
higher emission contents and larger social costs than some other deposit that it ￿nd too
costly to exploit. For this reason, a deposit market is even more important than before.
Theorem 1 (iv). In every equilibrium of the deposit market, M￿ s equilbrium policy
(4.6)-(4.7) implements the ￿rst best (4.5) even if fuels vary in their emission content.
Just as before, Lemma 2 and 3 continue to hold: Deposits are sold to importers and
there is no trade in fuel in equilibrium. Because every marginal deposit is polluting at
least e > 0, M purchases every marginal deposit from i 2 N, who ends up with a locally
inelastic supply curve.
However, Lemma 4 is no longer su¢ cient to reach the ￿rst best (4.5), since some
deposits might be cheap to exploit even if they are highly polluting. In equilibrium, it
turns out, M is purchasing these deposits.
Lemma 6. In equilibrium, there exists no e xi such that:
C
0
i (e xi) ￿ (p ￿ E
0
i (e xi)H
0;p), i 2 N.
In other words, i 2 N cannot own a deposit with marginal cost c and marginal emission
content e such that p ￿ eH0 < c < p. If i did own such a deposit, i would exploit it and
its marginal bene￿t would be p￿c. The marginal harm to M, however, would be eH0 (:),
which is larger than i￿ s gain. Therefore, M is purchasing all such deposits in equilibrium.
Lemma 6 ensures that i 2 N does not exploit deposits violating (4.5). M does not exploit
such deposits, either, according to (4.7) when substituting S0 (p) = yM ￿ xM = 0.
4.4. Shared harm and shared ownership
So far, I have assumed that nonparticipants do not experience any harm from pollution.
This assumption may approximate reality if the nonparticipants￿harm is only a small
fraction of the total harm. Moreover, if signing an international agreement is necessary to
overcome domestic resistance for a climate policy, the nonparticipants￿harm would not
23a⁄ect the equilibrium derived above. However, the above equilibrium would no longer
implement the ￿rst best, since M would not internalize the nonparticipants￿harm when
deciding how many deposits to set aside.
While H (:) measures the total harm, as before, let Hi (:) measure the harm experienced
by country i. Clearly, H (:) ￿
P
M[N Hi (:). The optimal x￿


















Parameter ￿i 2 [0;1] measures i￿ s marginal harm as a fraction of the total marginal harm
at the optimal emission levels.
Oil companies often share the ownership of oil ￿elds. Similarly, suppose that ownership
of fossil fuel deposits can be shared by countries. If a country owns a certain fraction of a
given deposit, and this deposit is exploited, then the country receives a share of the pro￿t
equal to its ownership-share.
Theorem 1 (v). There exist an equilibrium in the deposit market where i owns ￿i of


















i)8i 2 M [ N: (4.8)
Take a small deposit of size ￿ with marginal extraction cost c satisfying (4.8). If
exploited, i￿ s bene￿t would be ￿i [B0
i (y￿
i) ￿ c ￿ H0 (:)]￿ < 0, and every i would thus
prefer to not exploit such a deposit. This is socially optimal, since a deposit should only





i). Deposits satisfying c > B0
i (y￿
i) are not exploited
by any owner. Hence, when i owns ￿i of every deposit satisfying (4.8), the ￿rst best is
implemented, no matter whether the owners make decisions by unanimity or majority
rule. Lemma 2 continues to hold and, besides setting aside deposits satisfying (4.8),




The shares ￿i constitute an equilibrium since no two owners would bene￿t by trading
such a deposit share. If the consequence following such a transaction would be that a
marginal deposit would be exploited, the new owner j would bene￿t ￿i (p ￿ c) ￿ H0
j (:),
which is less than the harm experienced by the previous owner i.
24This is not a unique equilibrium when jNj > 1, however. If a deposit is owned and
exploited by a single owner, it might not pay any individual country to step in and
purchase a fraction of this deposit with the aim at preserving it. If the multiple potential
owners cannot coordinate such a takeover, other equilibria exist which fail to implement
the ￿rst best.
4.5. An example
Building on Section 3.5, this subsection presents an example to further illustrate the
main results. Let m measure the number of participants in M, n ￿ jNj, and suppose all
countries have identical demand and supply curves before any trade in deposits. Let these
functions be linear, such that demand is given by Bi (:) = byi ￿ay2
i=2 and Ci (:) = cx2
i=2,
i 2 f1;Mg. Finally, let H (:) = mh ￿ (xM + x1), since each of the participating countries
face the marginal harm h.
















The demand and supply for one country is illustrated in Figure 3. Each coalition-partner
produces and consumes f, in the ￿gure, while nonparticipants would produce and consume
y, if there were no market for deposits. M reduces its supply and demand by the same
amount, and its policies do not a⁄ect the non-participating countries. The nonpartici-
pating countries are, however, polluting too much. This creates a social welfare loss of
h2mn=2(a + c), measured by the green and yellow triangles (ksv) in the ￿gure.
With a deposit market, the equilibrium is as follows. M is purchasing all deposits
between f and g, with marginal extraction costs between e and d (or, in the equations,
between (bc ￿ hmc)=(a + c) and (bc + hma)=(a + c)). The supply curve of i 2 N shifts
to the red line (0ksw), while the supply curve in M shifts to the blue line (0kz). With the
supply tax hm in M, all countries supply (and consume) the optimal amount f. There is
no tax on consumers, who face the price d.
25Figure 3: Purchasing g-f in country i changes the supply curves and improves e¢ ciency
by ksv.
4.6. The price to pay
It has been assumed that the deposit market clears where there exists no pair of countries,
and no price, such that one country can sell a deposit to the other at that price and make
both strictly better o⁄. If this condition is violated, there are still gains from trade. The
condition is actually stronger than necessary, since the proofs only consider trade between
M and i 2 N. I do not need to allow for trade between i and j, if i, j 2 N.
Relying on this de￿nition, there has been no need to specify how this equilibrium
may be achieved. But there are several possibilities. A simple example is to suppose
that country i can make a conditional take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er to all the other countries,
specifying a new allocation of deposits (thus, implicitly specifying a vector of transactions)
and a vector of payments to be made. If every country can veto this proposal, the
outcome gives Lemma 2-4, and thus the above outcome.25 This procedure is referred to
25To see this, suppose that if there is no trade in the deposit market, country j gets utility Uj: With
a deposit market, j gets Uj, which depends on the allocation of deposits, minus qj, the payment it must
make. If i 2 M [ N can make a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er to the rest, it maximizes Ui +
P
M[Nni qj s.t.









M[N Uj, the aggregate surplus. Su¢ cient conditions for the
26as "conditional bids" by Segal (1999) and as "no free riding" by Joskow and Tirole (2000).
However, as these papers show, other market structures fail to implement the e¢ cient
equilibrium. For example, if M makes observable non-conditional take-it-or-leave-it o⁄ers
to the other countries, then M may prefer to restrict trade in deposits below the e¢ cient
level in order to a⁄ect its terms-of-trade.26
Referring to Figure 3, a ￿rst guess for M￿ s expenditures on deposit-purchases might
be the colored triangle ksu in Figure 3. When d is the equilibrium price for coal and M
purchases all deposits between f and g in country i 2 N, then M may have to pay each
marginal deposit-owner the distance between d and its marginal cost, returning this area
as the total price to pay.
However, the triangle ksu can be larger than M￿ s gain from i￿ s reduction in pollution.
M￿ s gain is the rectangle kstq, which has a smaller area that ksu if the supply curve
is steeper than the demand curve (c > a). M would then be better o⁄ not buying
any of these deposits, precluding this as an equilibrium. This possibility arises because
purchasing g￿y is a complement to purchasing y￿f. As for other complementary goods,
such as left-shoes and right-shoes, the buyer cannot be expected to pay its marginal
bene￿t for each.
Hence, if the owners of deposits are making take-or-leave-it o⁄ers to M, they cannot
require more than kstq in total - and they are likely to demand exactly this amount.
If M has all the bargaining power, on the other hand, it prefers to propose a price
for each deposit and let the o⁄ers be conditioned on all of them being accepted. If all
the deposits are nationally owned in country i 2 N, M must o⁄er ksv to compensate the
country for the welfare loss associated with the implied reduction in supply and demand.
But if the deposits are privately owned in country i, M may be able to pay even less
than this amount. If each marginal deposit has a separate owner who does not internalize
maximum are given by Lemma 2-4. In all equilibria of this game, xM = yM, but in some equilibria,
xi 6= yi for some i 2 N. Thus, this game has equilibria that does not necessarily clear the market the way
the equilibrium is de￿ned, but Theorem 1 continues to hold, nevertheless (since it only requires xM = yM
and not xi = yi8i 2 N). This implies that the de￿nition of a market equilibrium, used above, is stronger
than necessary.
26For instance, if M is going to be a net purchaser of deposits, i 2 N requires a higher price for selling
if M is purchasing a larger number of deposits, since the equilibrium fossil fuel price is then expected to
be high. To pay a lower price, M would then prefer to commit to buy less deposits, and it can do this
by o⁄ering to buy less. This market structure is therefore not implementing the equilibrium above.
27the consumer surplus, it su¢ ces to pay the yellow triangle (krv) and make the o⁄er
conditional on all o⁄ers being accepted. Alternatively, if there is a single private owner,
M must pay the yellow triangle minus the rectangle dprs. This sum may well be negative,
since the buyer is then glad to give up some of its deposit when it anticipates that, as a
consequence, the price-setter M is going to increase the price on oil to d. In sum, M is
likely to pay less if it has more bargaining power, if the deposits are privately owned and
if there are just a few owners.
4.7. Participation
This paper has focused exclusively on a climate coalition￿ s best policy, without any concern
for how to build the coalition in the ￿rst place. While analyzing coalition formation must
be treated elsewhere, participation is such an important problem that it is worth to at
least mention how a deposit market may in￿ uence the incentive to participate.
There is no consensus on how to model participation the most reasonable way. A
common method (see the survey by Barrett, 2005), is to introduce a stage zero in the game,
where every country ￿rst decides whether to participate. Otherwise, the game unfolds as
described in Section 2. To simplify, take the example above, but let every country face
the same marginal harm h from pollution. De￿ne l ￿ m + n = jM [ Nj: Furthermore,
suppose nonparticipating countries implement policies neither on demand nor supply.
This might be reasonable if an international treaty is necessary to overcome domestic
political resistance. In any case, the following results would not change substantially by
relaxing this assumption.
This participation game tends to create a lot of free-riding and incentives to abstain,
since abstaining does not a⁄ect whether other countries participate. Without a deposit
market, each country faces the following trade-o⁄: participating is costly since consump-
tion and production declines from y to f in Figure 3. On the other hand, every other
participant reduces its own pollution by h=(a + c) units. As in Barrett (2005), the equi-
librium number of participants is just 3!
Adding a deposit market can either raise or reduce participation. On the one hand, the
participating members are always better o⁄with a deposit market. Joining this coalition,
28moreover, reduces the pollution by h=(a + c) units not only for the participants, but for
every country. On the other hand, nonparticipants are also better o⁄ compared to the
situation without a deposit market. The coalition is successful in reducing emissions from
every country. Paying for this is costly, however, and by joining the coalition country i is
expected to share these costs. Ultimately, whether participation is more or less attractive
with a deposit market depends on the price one has to pay for such deposits. Even if
M can make take-it-or-leave-it o⁄ers, the price depends on whether it is dealing with
countries or private suppliers.
Proposition 5. (i) Without a deposit market, m = 3. (ii) If M purchases deposits from





2l(a + c) + a
lc + 2a
￿￿
= l if a=c ￿ l(l ￿ 2).
The function bxc calculates the largest integer weakly smaller than x.
If M makes take-it-or-leave-it o⁄ers to countries, it must pay each nonparticipating
country the yellow and the green triangle (ksv) in Figure 3. This price is so high that the
motivation to participate declines compared to the situation without a deposit market. If
this is important, potential members would thus like to commit, before the ￿rst stage, to
not use a deposit market later on. Such a decision is not time consistent, however. After
the participation stage, M would always prefer to purchase deposits.
On the other hand, if M only needs to compensate the producers of fossil fuel, paying
the yellow area (krv) su¢ ces. This price is lower, making participation more attractive.
If a is small compared to c, the yellow area dominates the green area, and m = 2 also in
this case. But if a ￿ c, participation is always larger with a deposit market than without.
If a=c ￿ l(l ￿ 2), full participation is possible.
4.8. Domestic opposition and lobbying
A tough climate policy might be supported by citizens and environmentalists, but pro-
ducers as well as consumers are harmed when introducing taxes on demand and supply.
29Deposit-owners are stuck and unable to move from one country to another, however, and
this may reduce their political clout. Industries relying on energy, on the other hand, may
credible threaten to move.
Without a deposit market, such consumers can bene￿t a lot from moving from a
coalition member to a nonparticipant. In the example above, the price is bhm=(a + c)
units higher in M than in N. With a deposit market, however, the price is equalized
across participants and nonparticipants. Consumers have then no incentive to move, and
this reduce their political clout if lobbying against a climate treaty.
Moreover, the incentive to lobby against a climate treaty is much smaller when there
is a deposit market. If a country i joins, the coalition reduces supply further and the
equilibrium price on fossil fuel increases by bh=(a + c) in every country. This price increase
is only a fraction (1=m) of the price increase for i￿ s consumers if i joined M and there
were no deposit market.
In sum, with a market for deposits, industries relying on energy have less incentives to
lobby against memberships in a climate treaty and they have, in any case, less credibility
when threatening to move. Participation in a climate treaty is thus meeting less resistance
if there is a deposit market.27
4.9. Other extensions
Nonparticipants￿policies: Even a country outside the coalition may have market power
to in￿ uence the fuel price, and it generally has an interest in regulating its supply and
demand in order to improve its terms-of-trade. Allowing for this would change the game
somewhat and perhaps also the outcome, if there were no deposit market. With a deposit
market, however, it would still be the case that every country would be self-su¢ cient
with fuel, in equilibrium, and it would thus have no incentive to a⁄ect the world price by
regulating its consumption, supply, or trade.
Mobility of ￿rms: While I have abstracted from ￿rms and thus their mobility, Babiker
(2005) shows that leakage can be much larger if ￿rms can exit and enter. With a market
27Analogously, Grossman and Helpman (1995) study industry groups lobbying for or against the par-
ticipation in a free-trade area.
30for deposits, however, ￿rms using fossil fuel as an input has no incentive to relocate since
the fuel price is the same whether they are inside or outside of the coalition. Thus, if
leakage is driven by ￿rms relocating, the results above would not weaken.
Information structure: Uncertainty regarding the environmental harm or the cost
of exploiting a deposit would not change the model much. The parameters above can
measure the expected values. If the buyer or the seller of a deposit had private information
regarding its cost, the model would be more complicated, and the proposal-maker may
want to design a mechanism to elicit this information. It would be more interesting,
in my view, to endogenize the information structure. A country may own unknown or
potential deposits, and with some e⁄ort one can detect whether these deposits contain
fossil fuel. Since the incentive to search for new deposits is stronger if the price of fuel is
high, countries may search more if there is a deposit market than if there is not. The e⁄ort
to search in country i 2 N is then suboptimally high, since it does not take into account
the environmental consequence if a new deposit is detected and exploited, or it may gain
from selling such a deposit to M even if it is not exploited and thus have no social value.
In principle, the climate coalition has an incentive to purchase potential deposits, or to
pay i 2 N for not searching. If such contracts cannot be made, the possibility to search
for new deposits would weaken the e¢ ciency result above.
To buy or to rent? As discussed in Section 3.4, the outcome is e¢ cient whether the
coalition can buy deposits or just pay i 2 N for not exploiting them. Buying and leasing
are thus having identical outcomes in the one-period model. In reality, however, this choice
may be important. If a potential deposit is rented, the owner i 2 N has a strong incentive
to prove that it does contain fossil fuel and that its extraction cost is low. Doing so would
raise the subsequent rental price.28 This moral hazard would disappear if the deposit
were instead sold to M. On the other hand, if M purchased deposits located within the
national boundary of country i 2 N, i may have a strong incentive to nationalize the
deposit and recapture its value. If nationalization is a bigger treat than the moral hazard
of continued search, M would prefer to lease rather than purchase the right to exploit
deposits.
28In addition, in a dynamic model M may try to in￿ uence the terms of its future leasing contract by
extracting less fuel today. This strategy may violate dynamic e¢ ciency.
315. Conclusions
A climate coalition faces several dilemmas. Not only are nonparticipants polluting too
much. If the coalition reduces its consumption of fossil fuel, the world price declines and
nonparticipants consume more. By reducing its supply, nonparticipants extract more from
their deposits. Furthermore, nonparticipants invest too little in renewable energy sources.
In response, the coalition￿ s best policy distorts trade and it is not time consistent.
A market for fossil fuel deposits solves all these problems. In equilibrium, the coali-
tion purchases the right to exploit deposits that are costly or polluting to exploit. This
eliminates the supply-side leakage, and the coalition implements its ideal policy simply
by reducing its supply of fuel. There is no need to regulate trade or consumption, and
there is thus no consumption leakage. The fossil fuel price is equalized across countries,
inducing optimal investments in technology. The ￿rst best is thus implemented, even if
some countries do not participate in the coalition.
Normatively, the result suggests that rather than focusing on reducing consumption,
climate policies should focus on the supply side - including the supply of other countries.
More generally, the result shows that e¢ ciency can be obtained without Coasian bar-
gaining ex post, if crucial input factors are tradable ex ante. This insight can be applied
to other contexts. For example, boycotting timber from tropical forests would decrease
the world price and lead other countries to raise their demand. To prevent such leakage,
a wiser strategy may be to purchase the forest or pay countries to let their forests remain.
The recent emergence of REDD funds is thus consistent with the prediction of this paper.
However, such crucial inputs may not always exist. Suppose the emission from a
deposit depends on the extractor￿ s carefulness (or method of extraction) as well as the
deposit itself. If such carefulness is noncontractible, moral hazard arises whenever the
coalition is not purchasing every single deposit. Future research should investigate the
best role for deposit trading in such settings.
326. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Di⁄erentiating (3.2), (3.3), and (3.5) gives:
(
dxi = S0
i (p)dp 8i 2 N
dyi = D0
i (p)dp 8i 2 N
dxM ￿ dyM =
P





















S0 (p) ￿ D0 (p)
:
Maximizing UM w.r.t. xM and yM s.t. (6.1) gives (3.6) as the ￿rst-order conditions. The
second-order conditions hold if CM and H are su¢ ciently convex, and they always hold
in equilibrium.




M (yM) ￿ C
0
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i (p) ￿ (yM ￿ xM) = 0:
The second-order conditions require that @2UM (xM;p)=(@xM)
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￿rst two conditions are, respectively:
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i (p) ￿ 0 :
Of the two conditions above, the ￿rst always hold. The second holds if H is su¢ ciently
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Proof of Lemma 2: Consider an equilibrium allocation of deposits giving cost functions
Ci (:) and equilibrium productions xi8i, and xi = Si (p) = C
0￿1
i (p)8i 2 N. Take a small
deposit of size ￿ with a marginal exploitation cost c, small enough to make the deposit
pro￿table to exploit whether owned by i or M. If the deposit market clears, i cannot own
such a deposit if M would value it more than i. If the right to exploit ￿ is transferred
from i to M, i￿ s utility becomes:
Ui = max
xi;yi
Bi (yi) ￿ Ci (xi) + c￿ ￿ p(yi ￿ xi) ￿ p￿: (6.2)
Whether or not C0








After the transaction, M￿ s utility becomes:
UM = max
p;xM
BM (yM)￿CM (xM)￿c￿￿H (xM + ￿ + S (p) ￿ ￿)+p(xM + ￿ ￿ yM); (6.4)
where I let M maximize w.r.t. p and xM instead of, for example, yM and xM. In any
case, (3.2)-(3.5) must be satis￿ed, implying
yM = xM + ￿ + S (p) ￿ ￿ ￿ D(p);
34thus a function of p and xM but not ￿. Using the envelope theorem when di⁄erentiating
(6.4), we get simply
dUM
d￿
= p ￿ c: (6.5)
Note that dp=d￿ > 0 follows when di⁄erentiating UM in (6.4) w.r.t. p and the second-
order condition holds. Thus, if yi < xi, the sum of (6.3) and (6.5) is positive, implying
that there exist some price which makes both i and M better o⁄following the transaction.
If yi > x, both i and M could be better o⁄ by the reverse transaction.
Proof of Lemma 3: To prove the lemma by contradiction, suppose that, for some i 2
N, C0
i (xi) were singular at the equilibrium deposit allocation and xi. Then C0
i (xi) =
B0
i (yi)8i 2 N, and there exists some deposit of size ￿ > 0 with marginal cost c ￿
C0
i (xi) = B0
i (yi) = p and





S0 (p) ￿ D0 (p)
￿
: (6.6)
If the right to exploit this deposit were transferred from i to M, i￿ s utility gain would be
(6.3), as before. But M would not produce from this deposit when xM = yM, according
to Lemma 1, and after the transaction M￿ s utility would be:
UM = max
p;xM
BM (yM) ￿ CM (xM) ￿ H (xM + S (p) ￿ ￿) ￿ p(yM ￿ xM); (6.7)
where the variables must satisfy (3.2)-(3.5), implying
yM = xM + S (p) ￿ ￿ ￿ D(p);
since i￿ s supply is reduced by ￿ relative to the initial Si (p). Using the envelope theorem





M (:) + H
0 (:) + p: (6.8)
Substituting yi = xi, the sum of (6.3) and (6.8) is
￿B
0
M (:) + H
0 (:) + c > ￿B
0
M (:) + p + H
0 (:)
S (p)
S0 (p) ￿ D0 (p)
= 0;
where I ￿rst used (6.6) and then Lemma 1 and 2. Since the total gain is strictly positive,
there exist some price which makes both i and M better o⁄ following the transaction,
implying that the initial allocation cannot be an equilibrium. It follows that for every
i 2 N, C0
i (xi) is nonsingular and, hence, S0
i (p) = 0.
It is possible that lim￿#0 S0




M (yM) < p = B0
i(yi), M would strictly bene￿t by increasing yM while simultaneously
obtaining i￿ s deposits with marginal cost c > p (such that i would not increase its produc-
tion following the increase in yM). Since neither p nor unused deposits matter for i 2 N
when xi = yi, i would be indi⁄erent to such a transaction.
35Proof of Lemma 4: The transaction described in the previous proof would be stricly
bene￿cial for all c 2 (p ￿ H0 (:);p], when substituting S0
i (:) = 0 in (6.6). Thus, i 2
N cannot in equilibrium own such a deposit, S0
i (:) = 0 on the interval (p ￿ H0 (:);p],
implying the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 2: (i) Note that @Uj=@ri = (xj ￿ yj)@p=@ri if i;j 2 N, i 6= j, while
@Ui=@ri = p + (xj ￿ yj)@p=@ri if i 2 N. Since
UM = max
xM;yM;rM





0 (p) ￿ (yM ￿ xM)]
@p
@ri

















j (p) ￿ 1=B00
j (p)
￿
< 0 for pre-investment policies, while after the investment
stage, @p=@ri < 0 follows from the second-order condition when maximizing UM w.r.t. p.
Thus, if S0 (p) > 0, socially optimal investments are given by k0
i (r￿
i) = p￿H0 (:)S0 (p)@p=@ri >
p = k0
i (ri), so the equilibrium investment ri is strictly smaller than the optimal r￿
i. (ii) At









whether xM and yM are sunk or yet to be optimally chosen. Substituting in (6.9) con-
cludes the proof. Alternatively, for post-investment policies, it follows from the envelope
theorem (when maximizing UM w.r.t. xM and p) that @UM=@ri = e B0
M ￿ p, which can be
written as (4.1), given (3.6).
Proof of Proposition 3: Lemma 1 continues to hold given the demand function Di (p) and
the supply function Si (p).When ri is sunk, demand is given by:
yi = Di (p) = e B
0￿1
i (p) ￿ ri ) @yi=@p = D
0






(p) = 1= e B
00
i (yi + ri):
Suppose now that ri is decided after M￿ s policy is set. The ￿rst-order condition for ri,
i 2 N, is p = k0
i (ri). Di⁄erentiating this, we get dri=dp = 1=k00
i (ri). Thus, demand is now
given by
Di (p) = yi = e B
0￿1
i (p) ￿ ri )
D
0








i (ri) = 1= e B
00
i (yi + ri) ￿ 1=k
00
i (ri):
The proofs below for Lemmas 1-3 and 5 permit heterogeneous fuels, as discussed in
Section 4.3. Lemmas 1-3 are obtained by setting Ei (xi) = xi.
Proof of Lemma 1￿and 5: Di⁄erentiating (3.2), (3.3), and (3.5) gives:
(
dxi = S0
i (p)dp 8i 2 N
dyi = D0
i (p)dp 8i 2 N
dxM ￿ dyM =
P





























i (p) ￿ D0
i (p))
:
M￿ s problem is:
max
xM;yM







+ p(xM ￿ yM);
giving the ￿rst-order conditions for xM and yM:
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Substituting @p=@yM = ￿@p=@xM = 1=
￿P
i2N (S0
i (p) ￿ D0
i (p))
￿
from (6.10) gives (4.6)-
(4.7).
Proof of Lemma 2￿ : Consider an equilibrium allocation of deposits giving cost functions
Ci (:) and equilibrium productions xi8i, and xi = Si (p) = C
0￿1
i (p)8i 2 N. Take a small
deposit of size ￿ with a marginal exploitation cost c and emission content e, both small
enough to make the deposit pro￿table to exploit whether owned by i or M. If the right
to exploit ￿ is transferred from i to M, i￿ s utility becomes:
Ui = max
xi;yi
Bi (yi) ￿ Ci (xi) + c￿ ￿ p(yi ￿ xi) ￿ p￿: (6.11)








After the transaction, M￿ s utility becomes:
UM = max
p;xM
BM (yM) ￿ CM (xM) ￿ c￿ + p(xM + ￿ ￿ yM) (6.13)
￿H
 
EM (xM) + e￿ +
X
N
Ei (Si (p)) ￿ e￿
!
;
where I let M maximize w.r.t. p and xM instead of, for example, yM and xM. In any case,
(3.2)-(3.5) must be satis￿ed, implying
yM = xM + ￿ +
X
N




37thus a function of p and xM but not ￿. Using the envelope theorem when di⁄erentiating
(6.13), we get simply
dUM
d￿
= p ￿ c: (6.14)
Note that the ￿rst-order condition of (6.13) w.r.t. p is:
(B
0
























+ (xM + ￿ ￿ yM) = 0:
(6.15)
Since (6.15) must decrease in p for the second-order condition to be satis￿ed, and since
(6.15) is increasing in ￿, it follows that dp=d￿ > 0.
Thus, if yi < xi, the sum of (6.12) and (6.14) is positive, implying that there exist
some price which makes both i and M better o⁄following the transaction. If yi > x, both
i and M could be better o⁄ by the reverse transaction. QED
Proof of Lemma 3￿ : The prove the lemma by contradiction, suppose that, for some i 2 N,
C0
i (xi) were singular at the equilibrium deposit allocation and xi. Then E0
i (:) is continuous























then i owns a deposit of size ￿ with marginal cost c and emission factor e￿ such that
p > c but

















If the right to exploit this deposit were transferred from i to M, i￿ s utility gain would be
(6.12), as before. But M would not produce from this deposit when xi = yi, according to
(4.7), and after the transaction M￿ s utility would be:
UM = max
p;xM





Ei (Si (p)) ￿ e￿
!
￿ p(yM ￿ xM);
(6.17)
where the variables must satisfy (3.2)-(3.5), implying
yM = xM +
X
N




since i￿ s supply is reduced by ￿ relative to the initial Si (p). Using the envelope theorem





M (:) + eH
0 (:) + p: (6.18)
Substituting yi = xi, the sum of (6.12) and (6.18) is
￿B
0
M (:) + eH
0 (:) + c > ￿B
0










j (p) ￿ D0
j (p)
￿ = 0;
38where I ￿rst used (6.16) and then Lemma 1 and 2. Since the total gain is strictly positive,
there exist some price which makes both i and M better o⁄ following the transaction,























then i owns a deposit of size ￿ with marginal cost c and emission factor e￿ such that
p < c but

















The deposit is not exploited by i and i is indi⁄erent to transferring it to M. If M owned
it, M would exploit it according to (4.7) and thus bene￿t from obtaining it. Thus, the
initial allocation cannot be an equilibrium.
It is possible that lim￿#0 S0




M (yM) < p = B0
i(yi), M would strictly bene￿t by increasing yM while simultaneously
obtaining i￿ s deposits with marginal cost c > p (such that i would not increase its produc-
tion following the increase in yM). Since neither p nor unused deposits matter for i 2 N
when xi = yi, i would be indi⁄erent to such a transaction.
Proof of Proposition 4: The ￿rst-order conditions for i 2 N are, together with the budget
constraints:
yi;t = Di;t (pt);









(xi;1 ￿ yi;1) = I1 ￿ yM;1 ￿ xM;1;
X
N
(yi;2 ￿ xi;2) = I2 ￿ yM;2 ￿ xM;2:
This system of 4n + 2 equations pins down pt, xi;t and yi;t for all i 2 N, t 2 f1;2g as a






















(dxi;1 ￿ dyi;1) = dI1;
X
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(dxi;2 ￿ dyi;2) = dI2:






































































1 (1 ￿ ￿))
;
dp1 =
dI1 (1 ￿ ￿)
S0
1 ￿ D0


















1 (1 ￿ ￿))
￿
:
At the policy-stage, M chooses fxM;1;yM;1;xM;2;yM;2g to maximize (4.2) for i = M. The















































































The ￿rst-order conditions for the ￿rst period gives (we can ignore the e⁄ect of xM;1 on
xM;1 + xM;2 using the envelope theorem since the f.o.c. w.r.t. xM;2 is equivalent to the












0 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)C
0
































For a given set of taxes, xM;1 would be given by
p1 ￿ C
0
M (xM;1) ￿ ￿x;1 = ￿ (p2 ￿ C
0
M (xM;1) ￿ ￿x;2):


































Note that ￿x;1=￿ > ￿x;2 if I1 = I2 = 0 < S0
2. The reason is that i￿ s aggregate production
is increasing in p2 which, in turn, increases more in ￿x;2 than in ￿x;1.
Proof of Theorem 1 (iii): Lemmas 2-4 hold for the same reasons as before and their
proofs are thus omitted. Substituted in Proposition 4, the second-period policies remain
the same whether or not M can commit to future policies. In either case, M relies only on
supply-side politics in the second period and B0
M;2 = p2 = B0
i;28i 2 N. In the ￿rst period,
M￿ s policy is given by (6.21) if M can commit. If M cannot commit to future policies, M
may also want to take into account how ￿rst period policies a⁄ect second period policies.
But since the second-period policy, given by Lemma 1, is identical to M￿ s ideal policy
(described by Proposition 4) if M can commit and I1 = I2 = S0
2 = 0, this e⁄ect can be
ignored (using the envelope theorem). In either case, (6.21) describes M￿ s optimal policy
for the ￿rst period. Substituting I1 = I2 = S0
2 = 0 in (6.21) implies B0
M;1 = p1 = B0
i;1. M
extracts the optimal amount since (6.20) implies p2 + H0 2 C0
M (xM;1 + xM;2), and i 2 N











. It is easily checked that this is satis￿ed for all i 2 M [ N.
Proof of Lemma 6: Suppose i 2 N owned a deposit xi such that p ￿ eH0 (:) < c < p,
thus satisfying (6.16). As in the proof of Lemma 30, case (i), the joint surplus of M and i
would increase if M obtained the ownership of this deposit. A price exists such that both
i and M would be better o⁄, implying that this cannot be an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 5: (i) is in line with previous results and its proof thus omitted.
(ii): The environmental bene￿t of joining is h2l=(a + c) since every country is reducing
pollution by h=(a + c) compared to when i did not join. But participation implies that i
looses the consumer and producer surplus h2m2=2(a + c). In addition, i must share 1=m
of the expenditures when compensating each of the n = l￿m nonparticipating producers











￿ 0 ) m ￿ 2:
Proof for (iii): The environmental bene￿t of joining is h2l=(a + c), since every country is
reducing pollution by h=(a + c) compared to when i did not join. But while i without
participating would only loose the consumer surplus ah2 (m ￿ 1)
2 =2(a + c)
2, by partic-
ipation it looses its consumer and producer surplus h2m2=2(a + c): In addition, i must
share 1=m of the expenditures when compensating each of the l ￿ m nonparticipating
producers ch2m2=2(a + c)


















l(1 ￿ ￿) + 2￿
￿ m:
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